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Abstract 
In the past 40 years, the EU has established a very successful and effective civil judicial 
cooperation scheme that applies to reduce barriers caused by coexistence of different legal 
systems to smooth cross-border activities and transactions in the single market. This scheme 
would cease being effective between the UK and other EU Member States after Brexit. The 
UK government has proposed that the optimal option is to establish a special partnership with 
the EU to maintain the existing cooperation after Brexit, which is not ecoed by the EU. This 
article aims to explore the feasibility of establishing such a future partnership in civil judicial 
cooperation and to examine the existing models that may be followed by the UK. It suggests 
that neither the Denmark model nor the Lugano II model would work effectively and 
recommends a unique ‘UK model’ to establish the future UK-EU civil judicial cooperation 
partnership. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
On 29 March 2017, the UK Government invoked Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union 
(TEU), which would result in the UK leaving the EU on 29 March 2019. In order to maintain 
consistency and avoid the cliff-edge effect of Brexit on the UK law, which is largely 
influenced by the EU law, the UK Government has proposed the European Union 
(Withdrawal) Bill (‘Great Repeal Bill’).1 Upon the Parliamentary approval, the Great Repeal 
Bill will become the Great Repeal Act to enter into effect on the day of exit. This Act will 
transpose the accumulated body of EU law, the Acquis Communautaire, into the UK law on 
the exit day.2 This transposition approach, however, does not provide the expected certainty 
and consistency in the field of cross-border civil judicial cooperation, which concerns 
harmonised EU law in deciding jurisdiction, applicable law and enforcement of judgments in 
civil, commercial and family matters, and judicial and administrative assistance in cross-
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border civil proceedings. 3  Many EU judicial cooperation rules are based on reciprocity 
between different Member States, which cannot be unilaterally maintained by the unilateral 
‘transposition’ approach.4  
Because of the inadequacy of the transposition approach, most commentators suggest the UK 
should enter into a special arrangement with EU to maintain the reciprocal obligations of both 
sides.5 This approach is endorsed by the UK Government in its position paper published in 
August 2017 as the ‘optimum outcome for both sides’.6 However, the same intention has not 
been demonstrated in the EU position paper published in July 2017.7 The disparity questions 
whether a future partnership approach is feasible in reality. In terms of a “hard Brexit”, 
judicial cooperation between the UK and EU would terminate after the transition period, 
which may hamper future interaction between citizens and companies in both sides unless 
both the UK and EU join an alternative effective international framework covering all 
relevant fields, which do not currently exist.8 Furthermore, although the UK position paper 
proposes this approach, it is very general and abstract and lacks details on how this special 
partnership is designed. This article aims to address these questions. It first provides a general 
overview of the current EU-UK civil judicial cooperation framework. Section 3 studies the 
official position papers published by the EU and UK respectively and explore the feasibility 
to establish future EU-UK partnership in civil judicial cooperation taking account of the 
practical and political reality. It concludes that maintaining healthy judicial cooperation 
would be mutually beneficial to both sides. Based on this conclusion, section 4 examines two 
existing models, i.e. the Denmark Model and Lugano II Model, and suggests that the best 
option for the UK is to establish a unique, unprecedented ‘UK Model’, which would be 
similar, but not identical, to the Lugano II Convention, which will convert the current EU law 
into a few international conventions to regulate the post-Brexit civil judicial cooperation 
between the UK and EU Member States.  
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 2. EU Cross-Border Civil Judicial Cooperation: An Overview 
 
EU aims to establish a single market to facilitate cross-border transactions and 
activities. 9 With the increasing integration, more EU citizens work, live and study in a 
Member State which is not their home and more businesses engage in cross-border 
commercial activities in other EU Member States. Due to the coexistence of 28 different 
judicial systems, individual and companies taking part in cross-border activities inevitably 
face the uncertainty as to which country’s substantive law applies to their rights and 
obligations, which court is competent to hear potential disputes arising out of the cross-border 
relationship and to assist them to seek redress, and whether their rights awarded by the courts 
or tribunals of one Member State can be recognised and enforced in other Member States.  
In order to provide certainty and establish a truly ‘seamless’ single market, the EU has 
adopted a large number of EU Regulations and directives providing harmonised rules to 
promote mutual trust and to facilitate effective cross-border civil judicial cooperation 
between Member States.10 The current EU judicial cooperation framework covers a large 
number of matters, from civil and commercial matters, 11  to family and succession, 12  to 
insolvency,13 and to relevant cross-border civil procedural rules.14 The ultimate purpose is to 
facilitate the mutual trust and cooperation between courts of different Member States in 
cross-border proceedings, and to improve certainty of individuals to enforce their cross-
border rights through the uniform jurisdiction and choice of law rules. Although the EU 
constitution gives the UK the right to opt out from the judicial cooperation legislation,15 the 
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UK has opted in most of these EU legislations, except divorce proceedings 16  and 
succession.17 
The EU civil judicial cooperation scheme has played an important role in promoting cross-
border trade and transactions, as well as other activities between the UK and the EU. Most 
commentators suggest that the EU law on civil judicial cooperation works effectively and 
successfully in facilitating cross-border activities.18 As the UK’s largest trading partners, in 
2016, 44% of UK exports went to the EU and 53% of all UK imports came from the EU.19In 
terms of employment, there were estimated 2.37 million people from other EU Member 
States (EU27) were employed in the UK between April and June 2017.20In terms of residence, 
around 6% of the population (3.6 million people) living in the UK in 2016 were EU27 
citizens, and around 1.2 million UK citizens living in EU27.21 The intensive trade, business 
and family connection between the EU and UK emphasises the importance of continuous 
civil judicial cooperation to provide certainty and to protect parties in cross-border 
transactions and other activities. Without any special arrangement, the current EU judicial 
cooperation scheme will cease being effective between the EU and the UK,22 which will 
result in the loss of certainty for cross-border players in both the UK and the EU, and cause 
the difficulty to enforce the UK judgments in other EU Member States and vice versa.23 
 
3. The Official Positions and Feasibility of Future Partnership in Civil Judicial 
Cooperation 
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3.1 EU Position Paper 
In the summer 2017, both the European Commission and the UK Government have published 
their Position Papers. The EU position paper proposes that the current EU civil judicial 
cooperation law shall continue to apply after Brexit in five cases:24(1) to decide the law 
applicable to contractual and non-contractual obligations for contracts concluded and events 
occurred before the withdrawal date; (2) to establish the competent court for proceedings 
brought before the withdrawal date; (3) to assess and enforce choice of court clauses 
concluded before the withdrawal date; (4) to enforce judgments rendered before the 
withdrawal date; (5) to govern judicial and administrative assistance of court proceedings for 
procedures and requests pending on the withdrawal date.25 Although this Position Paper may 
not rule out the possibility for the EU to enter into a long-term civil judicial cooperation with 
the UK in the future, it is based on the presumption of separation. The EU aims to protect 
certainty and clarity to citizens and businesses on the immediate effects of Brexit.26From the 
practical point of view, if the events that give rise to the parties’ rights and obligations occur 
before Brexit, the parties have reasonable expectation of their rights and obligations pursuant 
to the pre-Brexit EU law and that expectation should be protected to ensure certainty and 
consistency. From the theoretical perspective, the EU’s position is close, but different, to the 
doctrine of ‘acquired rights’. The concept of ‘acquired rights ‘is not present in the EU law. 
Art 1 of Protocol 1 of ECHR clearly protects ‘possessions’ of ‘every natural or legal 
person’. 27  Furthermore, individual’s ‘acquired rights’ is a recognised principle in 
international customary law, which protect ‘private rights acquired under existing law’ that 
would not be affected by the change of sovereignty.28 However, international law usually 
limits the application of acquired rights to property rights. Although they include intangible 
property rights, such as certain contractual rights and judgment credit,29 they may not be 
easily extended to all procedural certainty provided by EU private international law. The 
‘acquired rights’ doctrine in international law may only be relied on to justify the continuity 
of EU law in enforcing judgments delivered before the withdrawal, but not other procedural 
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rights. The EU position may better relay on the EU general principle of legal certainty instead 
of ‘acquired rights’ of international law.30 
However, if legal certainty is taken as the standard, as far as the parties have committed with 
reasonable expectation of the consequences under the pre-Brexit EU law, continuity should 
be provided. From this perspective, the EU has applied the ‘legal certainty’ standard too 
narrowly. For example, if the parties have concluded an exclusive jurisdiction clause 
choosing the English court, the EU believes that they have anticipated the current EU law to 
govern the validity of this clause. Under the current EU law, Article 31(2) of the Brussels I 
Recast suggests that if the choice of English court clause is formally and substantively 
valid,31 the English court should take jurisdiction, and the court of other Member States, if 
also seised by one of the parties, should decline jurisdiction in favour of the English 
court.32Since the parties have chosen the English court pursuant to the current EU law, they 
have also acquired the right to sue and be sued in England and no other courts. However, the 
EU position paper only suggests that this jurisdiction clause should continue to be ‘assessed’ 
under the Brussels I Recast,33and does not suggest that the EU law should continue to protect 
the enforcement of this clause if the proceedings are commenced after Brexit. The EU does 
not justify its position, but it is likely the EU believes that enforcing the jurisdiction clause 
against lis pendens is a procedural right that will only be acquired after the proceedings are 
commenced. However, it is necessary to note that although the proceedings are not 
commenced, the choice of court agreement is a procedure-related agreement and has the 
effect of granting the parties’ procedural rights and obligations, i.e. suing only in the chosen 
court. This right is vested even without the commencement of proceedings.  
Furthermore, the EU Position Paper only applies the pre-Brexit EU law to enforce pre-Brexit 
judgments. It is justifiable because where a judgment is rendered before Brexit, it becomes a 
right that the judgment creditor has acquired under the current EU law and this right should 
be continuously enforceable under this law after Brexit. However, in two other circumstances, 
the parties have legitimate expectation to enforce the judgments under the current EU law 
even if judgments are made after Brexit. Firstly, where the parties start proceedings before 
Brexit, they would expect judgments to be enforced and circulated freely within the EU 
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Member States, including the UK, under the pre-Brexit EU law.34 Since no one could predict 
how long it takes for a court to deliver judgments, whether judgments are made before or 
after Brexit is a total contingency, which should not affect the parties’ reasonable expectation. 
Therefore, the parties could acquire the right of free movement of judgments even before the 
judgment is made, which, unfortunately, is not recognised in the EU Position Paper. 35 
Secondly, if the parties, especially non-EU parties, have chosen the court of one of the EU 
Member States before Brexit, they have made this choice partially based on the 
understanding and expectation of the free movement of judgments within the Member States. 
No one could predict whether and when a dispute may arise, before or after Brexit. 
Commencing proceedings after Brexit should not affect the validity of this legitimate 
expectation. It is therefore argued that the parties also have legitimate expectation to have 
judgments made pursuant to a choice of court agreement concluded before Brexit enforced 
under the pre-Brexit EU law, even if the proceedings are commenced and judgments are 
made after Brexit. 
 
3.2 UK Position Paper 
The UK Government published its Position Paper one month later, which includes the 
response to the EU Position.36 The UK position is more proactive and long-term oriented. It 
does not primarily address the transitional position for rights acquired before Brexit but seeks 
a one-off long term special arrangement with the EU that apply immediately upon Brexit.  
The main purpose of the UK Position Paper is not to provide detailed suggestions on exact 
rules or techniques, but the general principles and the big picture on the way forward. 
Therefore, this Position Paper only includes the ‘framework’ instead of the suggested 
‘provisions’. The UK framework can be summaries in the four points below. Firstly, the UK 
will seek ‘close and comprehensive arrangements’ and ‘a deep and special partnership’ with 
the EU post-Brexit on civil judicial cooperation matters as a third country.37 Secondly, the 
special partnership is possible in that it would provide confidence and continuity to citizens 
and businesses in both sides, which is the shared interest of the UK and EU, and it is based on 
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the intensive cooperation that has already been established under the current EU law. 38 
Thirdly, this partnership is part of the UK’s global strategy to enhance global wide civil 
judicial cooperation. 39  Fourthly, if the future partnership cannot be agreed, based on 
separation, the UK agrees the EU’s smooth transition approach in principle by protecting the 
rights acquired before the withdrawal date but proposes the scope of protection should be 
expanded and the acquired procedural rights should be interpreted broadly.40 
The UK Government, however, does not provide more details as to how, and following 
which path or model, the partnership can be formed. The only suggestion is that the UK has 
the intention to incorporate the current EU choice of law rules that does not rely on 
reciprocity, into its domestic law to provide a coherent legal framework.41 It is because, 
firstly, these rules can be transposed into the UK law unilaterally without the EU’s 
commitment. This will at least provide certainty to individuals in relation to their substantive 
rights in the cross-border events. This will reduce the work for the partnership negotiation, 
which could only focus on rules that rely on reciprocity, such as conflict of jurisdiction, 
judgment enforcement and judicial/administrative assistance.42 Furthermore, transposition of 
choice of law could help establishing the partnership based on the similarity and coherent 
legal context.  
 
3.3 Feasibility of Special Partnership Arrangements 
The diversity between the EU and UK’s positions increase uncertainty as to the potential 
result of the negotiation, but it does not rule out the possibility of the future arrangement on 
civil judicial cooperation. The EU Position Paper does not say anything about the future 
partnership with the UK. This does not mean that the EU definitely objects this option, but 
because this matter is outside of the EU’s priorities for the current phase of negotiation. The 
EU ‘phased’ negotiation strategy means that the EU has established the negotiation items that 
deserve immediate attention to be negotiated first, which mainly include the protection of 
rights derived from the EU law.43 Upon successful and satisfactory conclusion of phase one, 
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the EU will move to phase two covering long-term trade partnership with the UK, which may 
likely include future judicial cooperation matters.44 However, the phase two negotiation will 
be on the preparatory work only. It will not lead to a concluded treaty by the end of phase two, 
and the specific treaty negotiation will only start after the UK leaves the EU.45 In other words, 
the EU may only start to negotiate the future judicial cooperation partnership after the UK 
becomes a third country, which may not provide the UK any privilege as an ex-Member State. 
Excluding judicial cooperation from the phase one negotiation has been criticised by private 
international lawyers. As judicial cooperation concerns the cross-border rights derived from 
the EU law, it is closely entangled with those substantive rights of EU citizens, and any 
negotiation on acquired citizens’ rights cannot be comprehensive without addressing relevant 
private international law issue.46 Nevertheless, as the EU has also confirmed in its negotiation 
strategy its wish to have the UK as a close partner in the future,47 negotiation on the future 
partnership is expected to be commence anyway in phase two negotiation and after Brexit. 
As a matter of principle, the future special arrangement on civil judicial cooperation is 
feasible. Firstly, the EU and UK share the common interest to preserve the existing certainty 
to protect not only their citizens but also economic growth. The share of UK imports by the 
EU remains stable between 50% and 58% between 1999 and 2016, and increase from 50% in 
2011 to 53% in 2016.  The UK had an overall trade deficit of £71 billion with the EU in 
2016.48   It would be EU’s loss if the lack of judicial cooperation affects EU exports to the 
UK. EU has interests to protect certainty of the 3 million citizens who are currently residing 
in the UK and others who want to work, study and live in the UK in the future. Secondly, the 
UK’s domestic law is largely influenced by the EU legislation, including some of its civil and 
commercial law, conflict of laws and cross-border procedural law. Many of these rules will 
be transposed into the UK domestic law upon Brexit which creates a coherent legal context 
for the easy establishment of judicial cooperation. Thirdly, judicial cooperation already exists 
between the UK and other EU Member States and the long history of cooperation forms the 
basis for the future cooperation. 
Furthermore, without future judicial cooperation agreements, the traditional common law 
instrument anti-suit injunction would revive. This is the injunction restraining a party from 
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suing in a foreign court, which is ruled by the CJEU incompatible with the EU jurisdiction 
scheme based on mutual trust between Member States.49 The post-Brexit UK would be able 
to use anti-suit injunction restraining parties from suing in the courts of any EU Member 
States, either to protect the agreements to choose English courts or tribunals,50 or because the 
EU proceedings vexatious or oppressive.51Although it does not directly target the court of a 
foreign country, jurisdiction of other EU Member States would be indirectly affected. This 
would also affect the coherent application of the EU jurisdiction rules because EU Member 
States take different attitudes towards anti-suit injunction issued by a third country.52  
Thirdly, special arrangements on civil and commercial judicial cooperation are compatible 
with the Interlaken Principles, which suggests that EU’s relationship with a third country 
should be based on “a balance of benefits and obligations” and the third country cannot 
choose which aspects of EU integration to join.53 In other words, the UK cannot pick and 
choose. This principle cannot be simply interpreted as that the UK and EU cannot enter into 
agreements on any matters without taking the full membership obligations. It simply means 
while entering into agreements with third countries, the rights and obligations of both sides 
should be equivalent and reciprocal.54 Judicial cooperation is supportive in nature, which 
does not directly generate trade deficits or surplus, customs or taxation. The EU actually has 
taken a flexible approach to judicial cooperation in that it allows Member States to opt-out of 
the internal judicial cooperation scheme 55  and it concludes similar judicial cooperation 
agreements with third countries.56 The Interlaken Principles is thus not a fundamental barrier.  
If a judicial cooperation partnership is to be established, the area where disagreement may 
likely to arise is the role of the CJEU. The UK’s position on the role of CJEU has altered 
gradually, from no jurisdiction at all,57  to no direct jurisdiction.58 The indirect jurisdiction of 
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CJEU is only allowed in interpreting legal provisions substantively based on EU law and 
concepts. 59The UK recognised the importance to keep consistent interpretation of those 
concepts between EU and third countries and within the EU, and accepted that if the 
partnership agreement includes terms identical in substance to EU law, those concepts can be 
interpreted in line with CJEU interpretation pro-agreement,  and ‘account is to be taken of 
CJEU decisions’ post-agreement.60 This is consistent with the EU position. The UK also 
recognises that there are precedents where an agreement between the EU and a third country 
utilise the EU concept and a binding interpretation of those rules is necessary, the parties may 
jointly refer the request to the CJEU for a binding interpretation.61 The UK does not state 
whether it would or would not adopt the same approach presented in the precedent, but it is 
likely compromise can be made.  
However, enforcement of the UK-EU partnership agreement is different. The future 
partnership agreement is an international treaty not EU law. Its enforcement and 
interpretation is thus subject to international law principles and by an independent third body. 
CJEU, as the court of the EU, will not be competent to resolve disputes between the EU and a 
non-Member State.62 Since the EU does not prepare for the negotiation of future partnership 
at this stage, it does not provide any position on the enforcement judiciary body of the future 
partnership agreement. Nevertheless, the EU has considered the enforcement of the 
Withdrawal Agreement,63 and the position demonstrated there could be relied on safety to 
deduce the likely EU position for enforcement of the future civil cooperation agreement with 
the UK. The EU mentions that due respect should be paid to ‘the Union’s autonomy and its 
legal order, including the role of the Court of Justice of the European Union as regards in 
particular the interpretation and application of Union law.’64  However, EU does not insist on 
the supremacy of CJEU over the UK. The EU, instead, suggests ‘institutional arrangements’ 
for the supervisions and enforcement of the Withdrawal Agreement, which means the 
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establishment of a ‘joint committee’. 65   This is consistent with the UK’s position. The 
difference between the UK and EU on the role of CJEU, therefore, is not incompatible.  
 
4. Future Partnership on Judicial Cooperation: Denmark, Lugano or UK Model 
 
After concluding the post-Brexit partnership for civil judicial cooperation is feasible, it is 
necessary to consider how this partnership arrangement should be designed. In general, EU 
has formed civil judicial cooperation partnership with states which are not members of the 
EU judicial cooperation scheme. These partnerships can be categorised into two models, i.e. 
the Denmark model and Lugano II model. This section analyses theoretical and practical 
prospects of these models and their application to the UK post-Brexit.  
 
4.1 Denmark Model 
Although Denmark is an EU Member State, it has exemption in relation to EU law on justice 
and home affairs. Denmark is not bound by EU law on civil judicial cooperation, including 
EU legislation, international agreements concluded by EU, and CJEU decisions interpreting 
provisions, pursuant to Title V of Part Three of TFEU.66 However, Denmark has participated 
in the EU jurisdiction and judgments Regulation on civil and commercial matters (‘Brussels I 
Regulation’)67 and its successor (‘Brussels I Recast’)68 through special arrangements with the 
EU. 
Taking the Brussels I Regulation as an example, which provided EU harmonised rules on 
deciding court jurisdiction in hearing cross-border civil and commercial disputes and on 
reciprocal enforcement of civil judgements between Member States before the Brussels I 
Recast took over in 2015. When the Brussels I Regulation was adopted in 2001 and entered 
into force on 1 March 2002, Denmark was not a Member State of this Regulation and the 
harmonised EU rules could not benefit citizens conducting cross-border activities between 
Denmark and other EU Member States. In 2005, Denmark submitted a notification of 
intention to participate. Based on the notification, EU and Denmark entered into the 
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Denmark-EU Agreement to apply the Brussels I Regulation to civil and commercial judicial 
cooperation between Denmark and other Member States.69 
Under the Denmark Model, the reciprocal obligations between Denmark and the EU are 
regulated by international law, instead of EU law. It suggests that, in principle, the post-
Brexit UK may be able to follow the same path by entering into a bilateral international 
agreement with the EU to systematically extend the effect of EU judicial cooperation law to 
the UK.70 Furthermore, this model provides some flexibility and autonomy to both sides. 
Denmark is not eligible to take part in amendment of the EU law,71 but at the same time 
Denmark is not automatically bound by any future amendments without express 
commitment.72 In the meantime, the EU is open to the application of Denmark to join its 
judicial cooperation scheme at any time, but also reserves power to examine whether 
conditions are fulfilled to ensure integrity of this EU scheme is not affected by the 
participation of non-members.73 
However, a close scrutiny suggests that this model does not work well for a third country, 
like the post-Brexit UK. Firstly, although Denmark has the flexibility to decide whether to 
adopt the amendments, Denmark is actually in a take-it-or-leave-it position once amendments 
are made. Denmark has to notify the Commission of its decision at the time, or within 30 
days, of adoption of the amendments by the EU.74 If Denmark decides not to implement the 
amendments or fails to notify the Commission within the time frame, the Agreement that 
extends the effect of the previous EU law, the Brussels I Regulation, would terminate 
between the EU and Denmark.75 In other words, if the EU has made the decision to amend 
the EU judicial cooperation legislation, Denmark has no right to contribute, express its view 
or shape the amendments and has to choose to adopt the amendments to keep the existing 
judicial cooperation relationship with other EU Member States. There is no possibility for 
Denmark to keep judicial cooperation with other EU Member States based on the precedent 
Regulation prior to amendments. Firstly, the EU amendment usually means that the old law is 
                                                          
69  Agreement between the European Community and the Kingdom of Denmark on jurisdiction and the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, [2005] OJ L 299/62. 
70 However, a detailed analysis suggests Denmark’s obligation under this EU-Denmark Agreement is different 
from ordinary international law situation. See discussion below. 
71Art 3(1) of the EU-Denmark Agreement. 
72Art 3(2), ibid. After Brussels I Recast was adopted to replace the Brussels I Regulation in 2012, Denmark 
made the notification to opt in the new Regulation. See Denmark-EU Agreement on the Brussels I Recast, [2013] 
OJ L 79/4. 
73Art 331(1) of TFEU. 
74 Art 3(2) of the EU-Denmark Agreement. 
75 Art 3(7)(a) and (b) of the Agreement. 
‘repealed’, instead of simply being ‘replaced’.76 A repealed Regulation would not be able to 
resume its effects between Denmark and other EU Member States. Secondly, the EU aims to 
preserve continuous application of EU law within Member States. Applying two versions of 
the EU law between EU Member States may affect uniformity, coherence and consistency of 
the implementation of EU law.  
Besides, Denmark is an EU Member State. While proposing to negotiate a special 
arrangement with Denmark, the European Commission considered it necessary to apply the 
uniform rules within the Community.77 The Commission also emphasises:  
‘Such a solution would have to be of an exceptional nature and apply for a transitional 
period only, the participation of Denmark in the Community regime would have to be 
fully in the interests of the Community and its citizens and the requirements imposed 
on Denmark would have to be identical to those imposed on all Member States, so as 
to ensure that rules with the same content are applied in Denmark and in other 
Member States.’78 
This statement shows that an inherent and underlying condition for the Commission to enter 
into an international agreement to extend the Brussels I Regulation to Denmark is the 
uniformity and interest of the Community, where Member States have the shared value, 
interest, duty and obligations. Denmark is an integral part of EU and EU has interest to 
achieve uniform application and interpretation of EU judicial cooperation law in all EU 
Member States, including Denmark.79 The requirement of uniformity based on the Union of 
integration and shared value can hardly be found in the relationship between the EU and a 
third country.80 
Furthermore, the EU-Denmark agreement restricts Denmark’s competence to enter into 
judicial cooperation treaties with third countries. Denmark is prevented from entering into 
international agreements which may affect the scope of the Brussels I Regulation unless 
Denmark and the EU have reached an agreement and satisfactory arrangements have been 
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80M Requejo, ‘Brexit and PIL, Over and Over’, http://conflictoflaws.net/2017/brexit-and-pil-over-and-over/, 
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made with regard to the relationship between this Agreement and the international agreement 
in question.81 This condition would not be accepted by the UK, which aims to regain its 
legislative competence after Brexit.82 
Finally, although the EU-Denmark arrangement is an international treaty, instead of EU law, 
it is drafted in a manner that re-emphasises the rules and principles of the EU. CJEU is 
designated as the interpretation, enforcement and dispute resolution body of this Agreement. 
Firstly, the CJEU has direct jurisdiction to interpret the provisions of the Brussels I 
Regulation annexed to the EU-Denmark Agreement.83 Denmark must request the CJEU to 
give a ruling on interpretation of this agreement under the same circumstances the Council, 
Commission or a court of a Member State can do in respect of the EU law implemented in 
this Agreement.84 If Denmark refers the case for CJEU interpretation, the ruling will be 
binding.85 The direct jurisdiction may cause difficulty to the UK, which consider the CJEU 
direct jurisdiction a red line and one important consequence of Brexit is to take back judicial 
supremacy of the UK judiciary.86 Secondly, the CJEU also has direct jurisdiction to interpret 
not only the EU law subject to the international treaty, i.e. Brussels I in the EU-Denmark 
Agreement, but also the international treaty itself. The EU-Denmark Agreement requires the 
Danish court to refer cases to the CJEU in questions on validity or interpretation of this 
Agreement.87 This model will cause more difficulty to the UK, because it subjects the UK to 
the direct jurisdiction of CJEU not only in interpreting the EU law, but also the international 
convention between the EU and the UK. 88  Thirdly, the EU-Denmark Agreement also 
designates the CJEU dispute resolution and enforcement body of this international agreement. 
Article 7(1) provides that the European Commission could bring cases against Denmark 
concerning non-compliance with any obligation under this agreement, while Article 7(2) 
continues to require Denmark to complain to the European Commission as to the non-
compliance by a Member State. This rule is based on the fact that Denmark is a Member 
State of the EU, and the dispute resolution between Denmark and the European 
Commission/other Member States should be the same as dispute resolution between EU 
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institutions and Member States established by the TFEU.89 The same dispute resolution is 
inappropriate to any third country. It has been suggested by the UK that an international 
agreement between the UK and EU should treat both sides contracting parties of the equal 
footing,90 enforcement of this international treaty is not subject to EU law, but international 
law, 91  and disputes between the parties on non-compliance should be addressed by an 
independent third body instead of the domestic court of any party.92 
Since the Denmark Model directly expands the effect of an EU instruments, it focuses on the 
Union interest to have EU law applied coherently within the Union and the EU emphasise the 
CJEU’s role in interpretation and application of the EU law.93 It is not an appropriate model 
to build the future judicial cooperation between the EU and the post-Brexit UK. 
 
4.2 Lugano II Model 
A different partnership model that practically extends the effect of the EU law to third 
countries without committing the third countries to the EU law and EU judiciary scheme is 
the Lugano II Model. In 2007, the EU entered into an international convention with Norway, 
Switzerland and Iceland on jurisdiction and recognition and enforcement of judgments in 
civil and commercial matters (Lugano II).94 This Convention is an international convention 
version of the EU Brussels I Regulation. The difference between it and EU-Denmark 
Agreement is that the latter directly gives the Brussels I Regulation the effect over a non-
member of this Regulation, Denmark. The Lugano II uses the international convention to 
regulate judicial cooperation in jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments between EU 
Member States and the three EFTA countries, without extending the implementation of EU 
law. But since the provisions of the Lugano II simply mirror those of the Brussels I 
Regulation, the practical consequence is to extend the same harmonised and reciprocal rules 
to the three non-Member States. 
It may be argued that the original purpose of the Lugano II is to strengthen legal and 
economic cooperation between Contracting States based on the established links between 
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them sanctioned by the EU and EFTA.95 However, Article 70 of Lugano II suggests that 
being a member of the EU or EFTA is not compulsory for joining the Lugano II 
Convention.96 The third country that wishes to join the Lugano II should follow the formal 
application procedure, make declarations on service of procedure and provide Depository of 
extra information, including its judicial system, internal law on civil procedure and 
enforcement of judgments and its private international law. 97  These conditions are not 
onerous to fulfil.  
Since Lugano II is not an EU instrument, it does not include special requirements for direct 
jurisdiction of CJEU in interpretation of this Convention. Although it is recognised that 
Lugano II has the substantive link with Brussels I and other conventions in this family, and 
holds a historic link with European Economic Community, Lugano II only requires the courts 
of Contracting States to ‘pay due account’ to principles laid down by the CJEU in 
interpreting relevant rules and concepts.98 It also does not provide the European Commission 
the power to supervise and manage the Convention, and a Standing Committee is established 
to consult the application of some articles, consider accession of new parties, accept new 
authentic language versions, and consult on revision and amendments.99 It does not include 
provisions on dispute resolution on non-compliance with the Convention.  
Finally, Lugano II does not restrict Contracting Parties’ power to enter into international 
treaties on jurisdiction and judgments recognition with third countries.100 The only restriction 
is prohibiting Contracting Parties from assuming an obligation towards a third country not to 
recognise judgments rendered in another Contracting State of this Convention,101 which will 
fundamentally hamper the purpose of this Convention.  
Given advantages mentioned above, joining the Lugano II may be a more realistic option for 
the UK. However, it is necessary to consider four potential problems with the Lugano II 
model. Firstly, accession of a third country requires the unanimous consent of all Contracting 
States.102 It is unclear, first of all, who should be counted as the ‘Contracting States’, the EU 
as one Contracting State, or the 27 EU Member States. Secondly, it may not be very easy to 
acquire unanimous support from 27 EU Member States. Some Member States have seen 
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opportunities in Brexit and have announced the plan to establish English-speaking courts to 
replace London and become the new dispute resolution centre within the EU.103 To these 
countries, excluding the UK from future partnership in civil judicial cooperation may benefit 
their litigation market. From this perspective, treating the EU as one Contracting State is 
easier for the UK, because the collective interest of EU may override the interest of 
individual Member States, and it is for the better interest of the EU to maintain the reciprocal 
relationship with the UK in the future.104 Interpreting the EU as one Contracting Party is 
likely the correct interpretation, because the EU has reserved the exclusive external 
competence on civil judicial cooperation.105 Where the Hague Child Abduction Convention 
accepted new Contracting State, the EU took the exclusive competence to give consent.106 
The EU has also announced in its negotiation guidelines that it would act as one unit and no 
Member States should act individually in negotiating with the UK,107 which would include 
giving consent to the UK’s accession to the Lugano II Convention. 
The third inevitable problem is delay. Contracting Parties have up to 12 months to give 
consent after the notification by the Depositary. 108  After receiving all the consents, the 
Convention will enter into force on the first day of the third month following the deposit of 
the instrument of accession.109 The UK cannot apply to accede while being an EU Member 
State and the process could only starts after the exit day, which will cause inevitable gap in 
time if the Lugano II model is followed.  
The fourth unsatisfactory factor is the quality. The Lugano II is based on provisions of 
Brussels I, which is updated by Brussels I Recast where some important amendments have 
been made. For example, it resolves the long-debated issue on the proper relationship 
between lis pendens and choice of court agreements and provides that the chosen court in an 
exclusive jurisdiction clause has priority over the court first seised by the party to hear their 
disputes, providing desirable protection to party autonomy; 110  it abolishes exequatur and 
streamlined the judgment enforcement procedure; 111it provides discretion to Member States 
to stay jurisdiction if the court of a third country has already been seised to hear the same or 
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related disputes to prevent concurrent proceedings;112 and it clarifies the relationship between 
arbitration and the Brussels I Recast.113 These benefits and improvements will be lost in the 
Lugano II model. 
The final problem is its scope. The Lugano II only covers jurisdiction and judgments in civil 
and commercial matters. Even if the UK joined the Lugano II, gaps still exist in judicial 
cooperation in other fields, such as family matters, insolvency and judicial/administrative 
assistance.  
 
4.3 Recommendation: The UK Model 
According to the UK position paper, the UK is seeking to establish ‘a deep and special 
partnership’ with the EU.114 Unfortunately, nothing has been said as to what this model 
would look like. Consider whether elements of the existing models can be learnt to shape this 
UK model. Firstly, the Denmark Model is specifically designed to deal with a special 
situation of an EU Member State. It is inconsistent with the UK’s needs after Brexit and it is 
incompatible with the cooperation between the EU and a third country.115 It would not be an 
appropriate option and it would not produce very useful elements that the UK Model can 
borrow. The Lugano II model, however, could form an example for the UK model to follow. 
In general, the UK and EU could conclude the international conventions, the provisions of 
which are based on the provisions of the current EU law. These conventions will have the 
functioning to maintain the existing cooperation between the EU and the UK, which will 
provide certainty and consistency. At the same time, these conventions will no longer subject 
the UK to the EU law and governance. The interpretation, enforcement and dispute resolution 
of the convention would follow the Lugano II in that the CJEU would not have direct 
jurisdiction in interpreting the partnership convention but the CJEU decisions on the rules 
and concepts substantively similar to the EU legislation would be taken into account by the 
courts of Contracting Parties. Supervision, enforcement and dispute resolution should be 
dedicated to an independent third body, such as a joint or standing committee with 
representatives from both sides.  
The UK government has suggested that it may consider transposing EU choice of law rules 
that do not rely on reciprocity into its domestic law to create a coherent legal background to 
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simplify negotiation for the future partnership.116 It is thus likely that the UK model will 
primarily focus on jurisdiction and reciprocal rules. Although some jurisdiction rules can be 
applied unilaterally, transposing jurisdiction rules may cause problems because there are 
reciprocal provisions on jurisdiction, such as lis pendens and the rules enforcing choice of 
court agreement. Furthermore, although the EU law requests no review of jurisdiction when 
enforcing judgments delivered by the courts of another Member State, exception is given to 
special jurisdiction provisions, such as protective jurisdiction for consumers, employed and 
insured, and exclusive jurisdiction.117 Excluding jurisdiction from the cooperation agreement 
may cause difficulties on negotiating enforcement of judgments in relation to these special 
cases.  
 
5 Conclusion 
The EU law on civil judicial cooperation effectively smoothes the barriers for cross-border 
activities caused by the existence of multiple judicial systems. Maintaining the current level 
of judicial cooperation between the UK and other EU Member States after Brexit would 
continue to provide certainty to citizens and companies engaged in cross-border activities in 
the mutual interest of both sides. Regardless of the difference in the EU and UK’s position 
papers on the future judicial cooperation after Brexit, this article suggests that establishing a 
long-term partnership on civil judicial cooperation post-Brexit is not only necessary but also 
feasible. While establishing this future partnership, adopting the Denmark model is 
inappropriate for third countries and it is impractical for the UK to directly join the existing 
convention with the EU. The UK should seek to enter into a few judicial cooperation 
conventions with the EU, constituting substantively the same provisions in the current EU 
law, covering jurisdiction and judgments in civil and commercial matters, matrimonial 
matters and parental responsibility, maintenance and insolvency, and judicial assistance in 
taking evidence and service of procedure abroad. At the same time, the UK would transpose 
EU choice of law into its domestic law to make the process easier.  
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